The path to harmonious regionalism: Negotiation, institutionalisation and consent-based hegemony by Ping, Jonathan
Bond University
Research Repository
The path to harmonious regionalism: Negotiation, institutionalisation and consent-based
hegemony
Ping, Jonathan
Published in:
2013 Islands of contention: History, culture, power, East Asia Security Symposium and Conference
Published: 01/01/2013
Document Version:
Publisher's PDF, also known as Version of record
Link to publication in Bond University research repository.
Recommended citation(APA):
Ping, J. (2013). The path to harmonious regionalism: Negotiation, institutionalisation and consent-based
hegemony. In B. McCormick, & J. Ping (Eds.), 2013 Islands of contention: History, culture, power, East Asia
Security Symposium and Conference (pp. 1-11). Bond University.
General rights
Copyright and moral rights for the publications made accessible in the public portal are retained by the authors and/or other copyright owners
and it is a condition of accessing publications that users recognise and abide by the legal requirements associated with these rights.
For more information, or if you believe that this document breaches copyright, please contact the Bond University research repository
coordinator.
Download date: 10 May 2019
Bond University
ePublications@bond
EASSC Publications East Asia Security Centre
7-1-2013
The Path to Harmonious Regionalism 通往和谐
地区主义的途径
Jonathan H. Ping
Bond University, jping@bond.edu.au
Follow this and additional works at: http://epublications.bond.edu.au/eassc_publications
Part of the International Relations Commons
This Conference Paper is brought to you by the East Asia Security Centre at ePublications@bond. It has been accepted for inclusion in EASSC
Publications by an authorized administrator of ePublications@bond. For more information, please contact Bond University's Repository Coordinator.
Recommended Citation
Jonathan H. Ping. "The Path to Harmonious Regionalism 通往和谐地区主义的途径" East Asia
Security Symposium and Conference 东亚安全座谈谈论会. Beijing. Jul. 2013.
http://epublications.bond.edu.au/eassc_publications/33
 
 
 
 
 
The Path to Harmonious Regionalism: Negotiation, 
Institutionalisation and Consent-based Hegemony 
通往和谐地区主义的途径：协商、制度化和基于许
可的霸权 
 
 
 
 
 
Jonathan H. Ping 
Associate Dean 
Bond University 
 
 
 
 
Peer-reviewed Conference Paper 
2012 East Asia Security Symposium and Conference 
同行互评会议论文 
2012东亚安全座谈谈论会 
http://epublications.bond.edu.au/eassc_publications/ 
 
Published Version July 2013 
 
For information about this paper or the East Asia Security Symposium and Conference 
Peer-reviewed publishing site, please contact the Editor-in-Chief Jonathan H. Ping  
想要了解关于论文、或东亚安全座谈讨论会同行互评出版地址的信息，请联系总编辑
乔纳森•H•平 
jping@bond.edu.au 
 
 
  
 1 
The Path to Harmonious Regionalism: Negotiation, Institutionalisation and 
Consent-based Hegemony 
 
Abstract: Three theoretical forms of hegemony are considered in order to ascertain the most 
compatible form for: the management of People’s Republic of China’s state power, the 
contemporary global political economy, and to obtain a harmonious regionalism for the 
Asia-Pacific century. It is found that negotiation, institutionalisation, public goods, consent 
and support from the United States of America are all critical factors in achieving China’s 
vision of harmonious world in its own region. 
 
Key Words: China, Gramscian, harmonious, hegemony, institutionalisation, negotiations, 
regionalism 
 
 
通往和谐地区主义的途径：协商、制度化和基于许可的霸权 
 
摘要：本文考虑了霸权的三种理论形式，目的是确定最兼容的形式，能够适用于管理
中国的国家权力、当代全球政治经济、并使“亚太世纪”能拥有地区和谐。根据研究
发现，协商、制度化、公共品，以及美国的许可和支持，是中国在亚太地区实现和谐
世界愿景的关键因素。 
 
关键词：中国，葛兰西式，和谐，霸权，制度化，协商，地区主义 
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THE PATH TO HARMONIOUS REGIONALISM: NEGOTIATION, 
INSTITUTIONALISATION AND CONSENT-BASED HEGEMONY 
 
Section One: Power and Hegemony 
 
The magnitude of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) in the global political economy 
requires an examination of the utility of different forms of hegemony. Whether sought or 
serendipitously gained, the PRC is at the cusp of hegemonic capacity. Correspondingly, the 
modern state and the states system are not yet cowed by other actors.1 The management of 
hegemony, the use of PRC state power, is thus a pressing matter to be studied lest it be 
misunderstood. 
 
The PRC hegemonic moment is imminent on account of relative productivity and structural 
power. Relative productivity, units of product per state, gives the PRC a potential capacity 
larger than all others. Susan Strange defined structural power as: “… the power to decide how 
things shall be done; the power to shape frameworks within which states relate to each other, 
relate to people or relate to corporate entities.”2 The PRC’s structural power arises from 
many relative measures: it is the most populous state, with about 20% of all humanity; it is 
the largest consumer of energy and many products such as meat and cars; its development 
model has lifted the largest number of people from poverty since the Second World War; and 
it is the first billion-plus state to industrialise.3 Given the present relative productivity and 
structural power of the PRC and the dynamic structural power gains that will result from the 
greater relative productivity, the question to be addressed must be: how should PRC 
hegemony be managed, and what form should it take? 
 
Hegemony results from the overlaying of a Westphalian states system upon the geography of 
the planet, the resulting different power resources, and the will to conduct international 
relations. These factors provide the hierarchy of great, middle and small powers. Study of 
hegemony has identified many alternative uses of power to achieve, manage or resist. This 
paper considers three forms: dominance-based realist/mercantilist; consent-based Gramscian; 
and structural power-based, from Strange and Kindleberger. The paper does so in order to 
determine which concept of hegemony is the best fit for PRC state power, for the 
                                                          
1 Other actors such as intergovernmental organisations, nongovernmental organisations or 
multinational corporations. See for this general argument Nick Bisley, Great Powers in the 
Changing International Order (Boulder: Rienner, 2012). 
2 Susan Strange, States and Markets (London: Pinter, 1994), 25. 
3 These measures are available from many sources. See for example Population Reference 
Bureau. http://www.prb.org/ (accessed May 31, 2012); Wall Street Journal, “China Tops U.S. 
in Energy Use Asian Giant Emerges as No. 1 Consumer of Power, Reshaping Oil Markets, 
Diplomacy,” WSJ.com, July 18, 2010, http://online.wsj.com/ (accessed May 31, 2012); BBC, 
“China emerges as global consumer,” BBC.co, February 17, 2005, http://news.bbc.co.uk/ 
(accessed May 31, 2012); Anthony Payne & Nicola Phillips, Development (Cambridge: 
Polity, 2010). Jonathan H. Ping, “The Chinese Development Model,” Chinese Engagements: 
Regional Issues with Global Implications, http://works.bepress.com/jonathan_ping/25/ 
(accessed May 31, 2012) or 中国发展模式: 国际发展与霸权 
http://works.bepress.com/jonathan_ping/27/ (accessed May 31, 2012). 
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contemporary global system and to achieve harmonious regionalism for the Asia-Pacific 
century.  
A hegemonic PRC may in practice select one form, a combination, or indeed none. Each 
theorised form gives rise to a different world and has different efficacy. The desired world—
the goal—envisioned by the PRC is harmonious world/regionalism.4 Thus, which form of 
hegemony is theoretically the most practical and effective to achieve the PRC’s Asia-Pacific 
century, regional goal?  
Dominance-based hegemony builds its power and charges its will from the characterisation of 
the global political economy (GPE) as being anarchic and conflictual, leading to a pursuit of 
superior power from superior threat.5 This form of hegemony has a long history with 
crescendos that climax in war and destruction of people, capital and markets. Several key 
economic characteristics of the contemporary system that mitigates this form of power are 
economic interdependence between states, reliance on the global common, and freedom of 
passage through maritime trading routes/sea lines of communication (SLOC). 
Interdependence of markets, production and resource supply is required to sustain the present, 
and aspired to, level of development. Reliance on the global common is emblematically 
displayed by the environmental movement. SLOC are mandatory for all states, and especially 
the PRC, given its need to develop in order to maintain domestic political stability, to gain 
access to oil and other resources consistently and at low cost. 
 
A second dynamic against the use of dominance-based hegemony is that it has historically 
been expressed most clearly as war. The utility of war between great powers (potential 
hegemons) is of limited use because of the significant capacity of these states to wage war, 
and particularly nuclear war (as a result of the invention of nuclear weapons there hasn’t been 
a hot war directly between great powers since). A final factor against dominance-based 
hegemony is the effects of perception, information and markets. Even the prospect or 
perception of political instability, let alone war, drives investors from markets, consumers 
from consumption, and restricts capital availability, thus retarding the development of state 
power by effecting economic growth, market size and access to resources. War, political 
instability and mismanagement of market perceptions in the present globalised market system 
all result in less power to be dominant and diminishes access to resources, undermining the 
hegemonic goal. Therefore, as a result of the contemporary form of economics, military 
technology and spread of information, the present GPE is not conducive to a 
dominance-based form of hegemony. 
 
Consent-based hegemony (Gramscian derived) is achieved when states believe that their 
interests are in part or whole served by the hegemonic state. Thus, states willingly submit to 
                                                          
4 See Xinhua, “President Hu Makes Four-Point Proposal for Building Harmonious World,” 
China View, September 16, 2005, http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2005-
09/16/content_3496789.htm (accessed January 5, 2011); Permanent Mission of the People’s 
Republic of China to the United Nations, “Statement by President Hu Jintao at the General 
Debate of the 64th Session of the UN General Assembly,” September 23, 2009, 
http://www.un.org/ga/64/generaldebate/pdf/CN_en.pdf (accessed January 5, 2011). State 
Council Information Office of the PRC, China’s Peaceful Development, White Paper 
(Beijing: Xinhua, September 2011), section 3. 
5 Stephen Gill and David Law, The Global Political Economy: Perspectives, Problems and 
Policies (New York: Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1988), 77. 
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and accept the hegemony of another because they believe that their interests are best served 
by giving consent. Gramsci’s original analysis was of Italian society in the early 20th century 
and directed to explain why a Marxist revolution had failed to occur.6 Of interest is the 
findings about the validity of the belief of those giving consent, and on the ability of the 
hegemon to influence the belief of others by providing information and a cultural context 
within which the others’ decisions are constructed. It poses the question: are the interests of 
the submissive state actually served by the hegemon, or are they being manipulated into false 
beliefs and consent? 
 
States that do willingly accept the hegemon, erroneously or not, may assist to support and 
maintain the hegemon as their interests are being achieved. Commensurately, the hegemonic 
state may actively identify threats and benefits within the GPE to maintain its own power. 
Great powers, and lesser states, with common interests to the hegemon may be characterised 
as free-riding on the efforts of the hegemonic state—saving their own power and benefiting 
from actions they would have, in any case, taken on their own. The use of this form of 
hegemony in the present GPE is thus possible and suited to the PRC’s domestic political 
economy. 
 
Structural power-based hegemony is presented here within the context of the work of Strange 
and Kindleberger. Kindleberger’s study of the interwar years 1929–39 identified that a lack 
of structural power (defined above) may result in a chaotic system, which he argued would be 
best quelled by a dominant state.7 
 
From these two positions, therefore, structural power-based hegemony can be identified as 
intrinsic power within the GPE that establishes the rules of the system for all states, whereby 
the system is made functional and stable by the dominance of a state. The relative size of 
population, economy or military is obvious to all the participants. The power doesn’t 
necessarily need to be used, but it is evident that one state has more power than others. Thus 
lesser states under this form of hegemony are impelled by the power differential into 
suppressing the extremes of their policy to that which is functional and thus behave as good 
international citizens relative to the dominant state. They are assured that if a 
chance-for-power is taken, the result would certainly be loss to the superior power of the 
hegemon. 
 
Tribute trade, ultimate tariffs and interdiction of ports by Chinese empires were based on this 
form of structural power.8 China was the largest by population and territory, most 
technologically advanced and militarily capable. Within the period prior to European 
involvement, the states within China’s sphere of influence knew of its dominance, making 
such policies effective. The requirement of the lesser states to interact with China was greater 
than China’s need to interact with them, and thus China was able to pursue a policy of 
suzerainty. 
 
                                                          
6 Robert Bellamy and Darrow Schecter, “The Prison Notebooks II: Hegemony, State and 
Party,” Gramsci and the Italian State, (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1993), 
112-136. 
7 Charles Kindleberger, The World Depression: 1929-1939 (Berkeley: University of 
California Press, 1973). 
8 Jonathan H. Ping, Middle Power Statecraft: Indonesia, Malaysia and the Asia-Pacific 
(Aldershot: Ashgate, 2005), 152. 
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The question, therefore, of how to use PRC state power and how to manage hegemony is 
informed by the contrast between the three forms: dominance-based hegemony, 
consent-based hegemony, and structural power-based hegemony. The first is 
counter-productive unless a complete reconstruction of the GPE is the goal. A derived PRC 
policy would be akin to the United States of America’s (US) Shock and Awe. The last, 
structural power-based, could be viewed as a destination to seek, but one which is presently 
unviable given the relative capacity of other states (see Tables 1 and 2 below, depicting 
military spending with the PRC lagging far behind the US; and population projections to 
2050, with the PRC being replaced by India as the most populous). A derived policy would 
require tribute from states to gain access to the PRC. This leaves consent-based hegemony as 
the principle form to be conceptually useful, practically achievable, and suited to the limits of 
power and the globalised interdependent GPE. 
 
Table 1: US vs. Global Military Spending, 2012 (budget authority in billions of current $US)9 
 
 
 
Table 2: Most Populous Countries 2013 and 205010 
 
                                                          
9 The Center for Arms Control and Non-proliferation, U.S. Defense Spending vs. Global 
Defense Spending, 
http://armscontrolcenter.org/issues/securityspending/articles/2012_topline_global_defense_sp
ending/ (accessed June 18, 2013). 
10 World Population Reference Bureau, 2013 World Population Data Sheet, 
http://www.prb.org/pdf13/2013-population-data-sheet_eng.pdf (accessed July 22, 2013). 
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Section Two: A Path to Harmonious Regionalism 
 
If consent-based hegemony is chosen—a combination is the reality but one would be most 
practiced over another—what is the policy path to harmonious regionalism? How does the 
PRC obtain consent to lead? The PRC would aim to secure the interests of the majority of 
states; or have states believe that their interests are being in part or whole satisfied. The 
provision of political and economic public goods is the most plausible path. Political and 
economic public goods are non-rivalrous and non-excludable, but may be provided by the 
hegemon primarily for their own interests, while simultaneously assisting others.11 Security is 
the most important public good—especially in East Asia due to the territorial disputes. In 
addition, without security, no other political and economic goods are sustainable.12 The PRC 
thus would attend to its own security in a manner that carries other states with it. 
 
This has been achieved previously. The United Kingdom (UK) and the US established 
hegemony in part by securing others through the provision of public goods, primarily in order 
to maintain their own security, but in doing so achieved hegemony through consent. For 
example, various alliance structures have embraced Australia, which in turn provided consent. 
Following the conclusion of the Second World War, Australia’s pursuit of its own security 
led to complementary agreements with both the UK and the US. From Australia’s perspective 
as a middle power, the fall of Singapore, February 15, 194213 proved sole reliance on the UK 
was flawed. The US had demonstrated its military power—and thus capacity to provide 
security to Australia—as a public good most clearly at the Battle of Coral Sea, May 4–8, 
1942.14 Thus, with increasing security concerns such as the creation of the PRC in 1949, the 
outbreak of conflict on the Korean Peninsula and the distance of the US, Australia concluded 
no one great power could be relied on exclusively, and it consented to both. 
  
Australia joined the UK’s ANZAM Agreement (Anglo-New Zealand-Australia-Malaya, 
1948/9).15 Subsequently, Australia consented to US hegemony, with its interests being gained 
through the US security-based alliances such as ANZUS (Australia-New Zealand-United 
                                                          
11 Jonathan H. Ping, “The Chinese Development Model,” Chinese Engagements: Regional 
Issues with Global Implications, http://works.bepress.com/jonathan_ping/25/ (accessed May 
31, 2012) or 中国发展模式: 国际发展与霸权 http://works.bepress.com/jonathan_ping/27/ 
(accessed May 31, 2012). 
12 Robert Rotberg, “Failed States, Collapsed States, Weak States: Causes and Indicators,” 
State Failure and State Weakness in a Time of Terror, A World Peace Foundation Book 
(Washington D.C.: Brookings Institute Press, 2003) 
13 Thomas B. Millar, “Australia and the American Alliance,” Pacific Affairs 37, no. 2 (1964), 
http://www.jstor.org/stable/2753949 (accessed June 6, 2012). 
14 Thomas Frame, Pacific Partners: A History of Australian-American Naval Relations, 
(Sydney: Hodder and Stoughton: Sydney, 1992). 
15 P. Edwards, Crises and Commitments: The Politics and Diplomacy of Australia’s 
Involvement in Southeast Asian Conflicts 1948-1975 (Sydney:  Allen & Unwin, 1992), 60-62. 
and Jayaratnam Saravanamuttu, Malaysia’s Foreign Policy: The First Fifty Years: Alignment, 
Neutralism, Islamism, Institute of Southeast Asian, (Singapore: ISEAS Press, 2010), 50. 
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States Security Treaty, 1951)16 (see picture below) or SEATO (Southeast Asia Treaty 
Organization, 1954).17 
 
Thus, the provision of public goods is not exclusive or competitive, and states may if possible 
prefer two providers over one. The UK and US both simultaneously provided Australia with 
the public good of security with ANZAM, or its successor agreements, existing alongside 
ANZUS until July 18, 1967 when the UK announced that it would withdraw East of Suez 
with all troops to be removed from Singapore.18 
 
 
 
 Pearl Harbour, Hawaii. 1952. The first meeting of Australia, New Zealand and United States 
military representatives. Seated from the left: Lieutenant General S.F. Rowell, Australian 
Chief of General Staff; Admiral A.W. Radford, US Commander in Chief Pacific; and Major 
General W.G. Gentry, New Zealand Chief of General Staff.19  
 
  
                                                          
16 Embassy of Australia, United States of America, “ANZUS 60th Anniversary Ambassadors 
Message,” USA.Embassy.gov.au, 
http://www.usa.embassy.gov.au/whwh/ANZUS60YEARS.html (accessed October 25, 2012). 
17 United States Department of State, Office of the Historian, “Milestones: 1953-1960,” 
history.state.gov, http://history.state.gov/milestones/1953-1960/SEATO (accessed October 25, 
2012). 
18 Derek McDougall, “Australia and the British military withdrawal from east of Suez.” 
Australian Journal Of International Affairs 51, no. 2 (1997): 183. Academic Search 
Complete, EBSCOhost (accessed October 20, 2012). 
19 Image and description from Australian War Memorial, awm.gov.au, 
http://www.awm.gov.au/collection/044320 (accessed July 27, 2013). 
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Table 3: PRC Mainland, Real Gross Domestic Product, 1978–2012 (units, 2005=100)20 
 
 
Significantly, the PRC is already providing public goods. Growing from domestic policy 
changes since 1978, the PRC has increasingly been providing the economic public goods, 
development and a market (see Table 3). Its development and market benefit firstly, but also a 
majority of states. The PRC is Australia’s number one trading partner (see Table 4), the 
largest economy in East Asia and the second largest in the world.21 Its demand for resources 
greatly determines Australia’s prosperity. However, in the post-Cold War environment, a 
market is not enough, and the US is still the main provider of security as a public good to 
Australia and the majority of states in the Asia-Pacific region. 
 
Table 4: Australia’s Top 10 Two-way Trading Partners, 2011 ($ billion)22 
 
 
                                                          
20 International Monetary Fund, IMF eLibrary Data, http://elibrary-data.imf.org/ Direct Link 
http://elibrary-
data.imf.org/QueryBuilder.aspx?s=323&key=1445284&f=1&ts=1&ys=1970&ye=2013&ms
=1&me=12&ds=1&de=31&did=321,322,323&id=68,46,41;46;47;49;51;195;197;200;201;20
6;207;208;209 (accessed July 20, 2013). 
21 CNN Money, World’s Largest Economies, 
http://money.cnn.com/news/economy/world_economies_gdp/ (accessed May 12, 2012) 
22 Australian Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, Trade at a Glance, 
http://www.dfat.gov.au/publications/trade/trade-at-a-glance-2012.html (accessed June 12, 
2012). 
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How does the PRC perceive the continuing provision of the public good of security by the US? 
Following meetings with Chinese Foreign Minister Yang Jiechi at the PRC Foreign Ministry 
in Beijing on May 14, 2012 Australian Foreign Minister Bob Carr said: 
 
“The most objective way of saying it is my three Chinese partners invited me to talk 
about enhanced Australian defence cooperation with the United States. I think their 
view can be expressed that the time for Cold War alliances have long since passed.”23 
 
Cold War alliance structures may be considered by the PRC to be a relic, but they must have 
something to replace these relics. Otherwise states caught in history, with no modern public 
good being offered, will be threatened by the PRC, and may actively encourage the US to 
maintain and even increase its role as provider of security, as hegemon. If the PRC altered its 
strategy, expanded its provision of public goods, and wished to offer a replacement for the 
relics, then how could this be sustainably done? Very importantly, how could it be done so 
that the majority of states believe that PRC public goods are serving their security interests, 
leading to consent? 
 
Arguably, the greatest innovation of the US, following UK hegemony, was to employ an 
institutionalised form. The benefit is real or perceived transparent use of power, increased 
awareness and accommodation of group interests, stability, continuity and a greater 
probability of belief. Through negotiations in the 1940s a framework was established for the 
use of power to provide political and economic public goods. The principle negotiators for 
the US and UK were Harry Dexter White and John Maynard Keynes (pictured below); and 
whilst their goal was not exclusively security, it was primarily the provision of public goods 
upon which the GPE could be rebuilt following the end of the Second World War.  
 
 
Assistant Secretary, US Treasury, Harry Dexter White (left) and John Maynard Keynes, 
honorary advisor to the UK Treasury at the inaugural meeting of the International Monetary 
Fund’s Board of Governors in Savannah, Georgia, US, March 8, 1946.24 
                                                          
23 Philip Wen, “Cold War warning as China hits out at defence co-operation with US,” 
Sydney Morning Herald, May 15, 2012, http://www.smh.com.au/opinion/political-news/cold-
war-warning-as-china-hits-out-at-defence-cooperation-with-us-20120514-1ynbl.html  
(accessed June 12, 2012). 
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During July 1–22, 1944 the US hosted the United Nations Monetary and Financial 
Conference at Bretton Woods in New Hampshire.25 The 44 stakeholder states agreed 
solutions to complex problems in great detail, but which had been deliberated and negotiated 
by experts for several years. The financial mechanisms of the International Monetary Fund 
and the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, which still exist today, were 
agreed. This was achieved through broad multilateral negotiations within which the UK and 
US led through intellectual capacity, ideas and diplomatic skill. Firstly, they worked together 
to create public goods for the majority of states. Secondly, White and Keynes, as experts, 
drafted plans, and then negotiated a compromise to achieve outcomes between the existing 
and rising hegemonic states for their provision. The style was inclusive, outcomes-focused 
and institutionalised. Thus White-Keynes style negotiations were used to establish an 
institutionalised framework for the use of power to provide political and economic public 
goods. 
 
To establish security in the Asia-Pacific century for the majority of states, and to establish 
consent-based hegemony for the management of PRC state power, a similar process may be 
considered. Thus, the US (as the present hegemon) and PRC working cooperatively to 
provide security is possible, and does not need to be competitive, and will work effectively to 
obtain consent from other states when institutionalised. The consent-based form of hegemony 
gives guidance to the use of PRC state power and assists it towards hegemony in a 
cooperative and sustainable manner—serving to avoid conflict, and maintain and assist the 
present GPE. This is thus a theoretically viable path to the PRC’s harmonious world; one 
were the PRC leads through intellectual capacity, ideas and diplomatic skill. 
 
What then is the first step to achieve consent-based hegemony? Of all states in the 
Asia-Pacific, the first state to give consent must be the US. Without the consent of the US, 
the middle and small powers in the region are unlikely to consent to PRC hegemony for fear 
of loss of public goods. To obtain US consent, the PRC must work to satisfy the US that its 
security interests are being fulfilled by PRC policy and use of power. The most pressing 
matters for the PRC to address with intellect-ideas-diplomatic-skill leadership, that should be 
resolved first, are US security interests such as: Korean Peninsula tensions, Japan’s security, 
Taiwan’s insecurity, South China Sea territorial disputes, and maintaining SLOC. Through 
satisfying the US, and in the US giving consent, other regional states’ belief that their 
interests are being fulfilled is likely, as they remain able to free-ride on the political and 
economic public goods that the US provides. In time, as the US belief in the PRC public 
goods increases, US withdrawal from Korean, Japanese and Taiwanese security interests is 
probable, as free-riding is imaginable. 
 
Why is this necessary when the PRC could simply provide consent to the US? The relative 
structural power of the PRC is rising relative to the US. The states system has an historical 
expectation that such power will cause change, instability and insecurity. Negotiations that 
institutionalise and replicate the new structural power realities, with the US—as the presently 
hegemonic state—giving consent to the PRC, the new system of related hegemonic power 
may be constructed whilst maintaining the existing public goods. This may occur over 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
24 Image and description from International Monetary Fund, 
http://www.imf.org/external/np/adm/pictures/captions.htm, (accessed June 21, 2013). 
25 United States Department of State, Office of the Historian, “Milestones: 1937-1945,” 
history.state.gov, http://history.state.gov/milestones/1937-1945/BrettonWoods (accessed 
October 25, 2012). 
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decades, and in practice the PRC must pursue appropriate policies. It has the power to shape 
the Asia-Pacific century, but not on its own. For example, the PRC may need to establish a 
single dominant regional organisation based in Beijing, funded and of use to the region, that 
is accepted (given consent) and part of the broader global intergovernmental infrastructure. 
 
Is the PRC presently acting in this style of negotiated, institutionalised, consent-based 
hegemony? A positive example regards the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, six party 
talks.26 However, why have these not been successful? If they are not successful, then the 
PRC is failing to provide the public good and is thus unable to obtain consent. Management 
of the South China Sea territorial disputes is a negative example.27 Continued insistence of a 
bilateral approach, beginning from the nine dash line, is more akin to dominance-based 
hegemony, and does not acknowledge the structural power limitations of the PRC versus the 
other states concerned.28 Hence, presently the PRC is not pursuing a path to harmonious 
regionalism. For harmonious regionalism, the Asia-Pacific century requires hegemony that is 
consent-based, institutionalised, and built from a negotiated process that results in the 
provision of public goods by the PRC, with the US giving consent first. 
                                                          
26 Choo Jaewoo, “Is Institutionalization of the Six-Party Talks Possible?,” East Asia: An 
International Quarterly 22, no. 4 (2005): 39-58. Academic Search Complete, 
EBSCOhost (accessed October 27, 2012). 
27 Peter Dutton, “Three disputes and three objectives,” Naval War College Review 64, no. 4 
(2011): 42-67. Academic Search Complete, EBSCOhost (accessed October 27, 2012). 
28 2012 East Asia Security Symposium and Conference and Ben Dolven, Shirley A. Kan and 
Mark E. Manyin, Maritime Territorial Disputes in East Asia: 
Issues for Congress, January 30, 2013, http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R42930.pdf (accessed 
March 25, 2013).  
 
